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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C. 
Plaintiff, Counterclaim 
Defendant, and Appellee 
vs. 
EVAN O. ROLLER, 
Defendant, Counterclaimant, 
and Appellant. 
Case No. 960590-CA 
(Priority No. 10) 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
THE JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE 
The difference between Appellant's designation of this appeal as an interlocutory 
appeal and the Appellee's attempt to limit the appeal to a Rule 54(b) Certification is 
noteworthy. Under Rule 27, U.R.A.P., interlocutory appeals have oral argument priority 
10, which the Appellant designated. Appellee designated argument priority 15. Black's Law 
Dictionary, 4th Edition, Page 952, states "interlocutory" is "something intervening between 
the commencement and the end of a suit, which decides some point or matter, but is not 
a final decision of the whole controversy." Also focusing on a final decision on less than the 
whole, Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., states: 
. . .the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by 
1 
the Court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction 
for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or rights and liabilities of fewer than all 
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, 
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties. (Emphasis added.) 
Rule 54(b) provides finality to an interlocutory order. The definition of interlocutory is 
more inclusive than a Rule 54(b) certification. All 54(b) certifications are interlocutory. 
Some interlocutory orders are not granted Rule 54(b) certification. A partial decision 
having a Rule 54(b) certification is still interlocutory. Argument priority number 10 is 
appropriate. 
Appellee argues against the broader "interlocutory" designation of this appeal to limit 
appeal issues to only whether Roller's malpractice counterclaim against Preston should be 
dismissed.1 Roller's Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order, dated 
March 21, 1996, sought an appeal from the Interlocutory Order the Trial Court signed 
March 18,1996. The March 18 Order granted Rule 54(b) certification to the Court's Partial 
Summary Judgment Order of September 25, 1996. The interlocutory Partial Summary 
Judgment thus obtained Rule 54(b) certification, subject to appeal as a matter of right. The 
Petition for Permission to Appeal was accepted by the Supreme Court's Order of June 19, 
1996, Supreme Court No. 960162, and the appeal can thus include all matters raised by the 
Petition: 
See pp. 19-21, Brief of Appellee. 
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The Court finds that the summary judgment was certifiable under Rule 54(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, and is therefore, final and the petition for 
interlocutory appeal should be treated as a notice of appeal. 
This Order does not appear to reject the Petition for Permission to Appeal from 
Interlocutory Order, or to substitute the relief requested. It takes the shortest route to 
approve the interlocutory appeal. 
The appeal is, thus, of the interlocutory ruling March 19, 1996, rather than only the 
September 25, 1996 Partial Summary Judgment. This Court may therefore choose to 
reevaluate the Trial Court's ruling, and limit the issues of fact in the accounting portion of 
the case. If it did, this Court could grant Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment that Koller overpaid Preston at least the principal amount of $11,669.78, and 
determine there are no other accounting issues of material fact, and dismiss the Complaint. 
Avoiding this review appears to be Appellee's motive in arguing there is really only one 
issue on appeal. Koller argues this issue in Point VI of his Argument, Page 37 and Page 
14, Part 5 and Footnote 9, Brief of Appellant. 
Of course the main issue of Roller's Interlocutory Appeal is to require trial of the 
disputed material facts about Preston's alleged legal malpractice. Koller desires this 
evidence be presented to the jury, along with evidence of all remaining accounting issues. 
Roller's accounting counterclaim alleges over-billing related not only to inadequate legal 
work, but also caused by errors in Preston's billing procedure. 
THE ONE CENTRAL ISSUE 
The Trial Court did not give Koller the favorable inferences to which he is entitled, 
as opposer of the Summary Judgment. Most of Roller's Counterclaim, the part alleging 
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inadequate legal work, was improperly dismissed. There are genuine material disputes 
about Plaintiffs inadequate work, and about Roller's right to personally testify about those 
facts, and about the amount of time Koller is allowed to obtain expert witnesses. Koller was 
denied his rightful inferences! The main issue is not whether Koller had expert witness(es) 
"fully prepared" and deposed by October 28, 1996. The issue is the reasonableness of the 
Orders dismissing most of Roller's Counterclaim. 
THE MOST CRITICAL STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Had the Court reviewed the facts and all factual inferences in the light most 
favorable to Koller, the Trial Court would have applied the standards described on Pages 
24 through 26 of the Brief of Appellant Evan O. Koller. The Judge would have concluded 
or inferred Koller presented enough evidence to show the elements of malpractice required 
by Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993), and met the standard for client 
testimony supported in Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). The Court also 
would have determined the sanction Plaintiff asked for, dismissal, was too final and 
exceeded the guidelines of Rule 37(b)(2) U.R.C.P., to only impose sanctions "as are just". 
The Trial Court's decision was not just, because it was made before a Rule 37(a) Motion 
to Compel, before any discovery conference contemplated by Rule 26(f) U.R.C.P., without 
also resolving all discovery issues, without any trial date, and before there had been a pre-
trial conference. The Judge imposed a discovery cut-off date only for Defendant's expert, 
while other discovery had not been concluded. This is contrary to the standards impliedly 
accepted by the Court of Appeals in Hoopilaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 
270,271 (Utah App. 1987), which only approved the sanction of granting summary judgment 
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to dismiss on the very eve of trial, within one week of the trial setting. See pp. 29, 30 Brief 
App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) and Carman v. Slavens, 546 Y Id 6r 
1976) suggest a general witness disclosure date after a T : 
pleadii lgs are n lore appropriate than dismissal. These cases found trial judge abuses of 
discretion had denied litigants' rights by dismissing too hastily 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There were definite material disputes about Plaintiffs alleged malpractice. The Trial 
Court abused its discretion l"v ifiipoMiii1: llit; s.tir Irii "I 'hsinissing tin. p'trtnns "I l\ illi i \ 
counterclaim alleging malpractice because Koller had not obtained an attorney expert ! ••n\ 
prepared with final opinions about Preston's duty of care, "J'lie Judge admiilctl he did nol 
piM"in\ .OTitl.'U!1'- i" I- *"' I -1|» • \r*\"c< nt which were Roller's sworn affidavits or sworn answers 
to Interrogatories, all filed before the August 29, 1995 hearing. Preston produced no 
affidavits on IL, m<i Nil i mMi i>l in ilphu IM MI1 inemnunda arginnj! (oi puu t Juia! 
sanctions because a fully prepared expert had not yet been identified. The record itself 
shows the procedural expectations discussed in the Standard jf Reviev ? ei e also • : n litt sd 
1 •« • • *\ er\ cut-off date for Roller's expert was isolated from all other discovery matters, 
and not reasonably related to any trial date, because there was none There was none 
i ,
 c f tj conference or discovery conference was conducted. 
The Judge was without adequate foundation to impose this sanction. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUDGE DID NOT REVIEW THE FACTS AND ALL FACTUAL 
INFERENCES IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO ROLLER. 
Rules of procedure for the conduct of trials must ultimately be consistent with the 
requirements of the U. S. Constitution, which Article VI(2) thereof requires to be "the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything 
in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding". Judicial officers 
take an oath to support the U. S. Constitution. The Trial Court's Summary Judgment 
denied Roller's right to present evidence to the jury he requested to evaluate Preston's work 
and billings. The Judge misquoted Roller's suggestion that Roller himself could testify 
about some issues, "It's so obvious that no attorney or expertise would be necessary", was 
according to the Judge, "in the Court's mind, not credible"2. What Roller actually said 
through his counsel is at R. 815-822. Roller said having an expert was likely the best idea, 
but discovery was still continuing, and it was too early to require an expert. See especially 
pages R. 819-820. The Trial Court ruling is not credible for three reasons. (1) The Court 
did not bother to favor Roller in its review of either the facts about malpractice or the facts 
about the incomplete discovery and other procedural matters. (2) The Trial Judge did not 
actually read Roller's affidavits. And, (3) the Trial Judge did not allow Roller's reasonable 
request for more time when he asked for it. 
Roller looked in earnest for expert witnesses when the Court told him to. He spent 
several days and several thousand dollars for their time in review. After the hearing August 
2 R. 826, Lines 12 and 13. 
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29, 1996, Defendant also had to deal with issues relating to pure accounting questions, as 
:
 in Koller * -* 
Octobc' ! 1995, R, 481-496. That granting more time was reasonable was presented by 
a M o t i u n i \ i c i i i u j d j n l u h i i l I H I i ili I i i 1 . i i i i II l'i U i l l u ' l ' s Af l l i l i lN I1 IM*) S ( ) 4 , 
all on October 24,1995. These completely destroy Appellee's argument that Koller ignored 
the Judge's Order of August 29, 1995. Koller said he had contacted a number of attorneys 
,iiL.I .mdil'iis tn Iiiid potential experts, October 24, 1995 Affidavit, R. 505, 113; spent many 
days identifying, preparing, and copying documents to take to the potential experts because 
reviewing documents, c5, 6, ai« id that one potential expert, Jeffrey W. Appel -AXA he 
could not be prepared to nmrppi ., , 
Koller also had to spend a great deal of time keeping his farm and other work, 118. 
Notwithstanding his time demands, Koller spent four days in Salt Lake City meeting with 
. .d ,-R - r *' .a 
also filed the same opposition at 521-516 and 536-540). Kolle• was not ignoring the Order. 
His effoi tsweu ihati. ••: ^ - \ 
was ignored '" *^]ert^n | h< atfi<l;*\ir u<»fii Jeiii-j. \\ ntl was ,icluall> available 
December 12, Nso and tiled m the Coin c December 1 H , . 1 
Ihe Trial Court did not review the facts concerning Koller's efforts to provide an 
expert, and all reasonable inferences that can be derived therefrom in the light most 
I I' i H; il >li In ivi ill 11 i I In I in il ( 'null ' I in mi in I lie ic versed. 
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The Trial Court had an obligation to review the facts and all factual inferences in a 
light most favorable to Koller. Did Appellee demonstrate the Trial Court did this? No. 
The Appellee only demonstrated the Trial Court dismissed Roller's Counterclaim 
malpractice allegations because Koller did not produce a fully-prepared and deposed expert 
by October 28, 1995. The dismissal was unwarranted by the circumstances. 
The Trial Court did not give Koller the favorable inferences to which he is entitled, 
as the opposer of the Summary Judgment. Most of Roller's Counterclaim, the part alleging 
inadequate legal work, was improperly dismissed. There are genuine material disputes 
about Plaintiffs inadequate work, and about Roller's right to personally testify about those 
facts, and about the amount of time Koller is allowed to get expert testimony. Koller was 
denied his rightful inferences! The main issue is not whether Koller had expert witness(es) 
"fully prepared" and deposed by October 28, 1996. The issue is the reasonableness of the 
Orders dismissing most of Roller's Counterclaim. 
Without reading Roller's affidavits, containing at least the last 146 of 372 pages the 
Judge said he attempted to speed read before 11:00 a.m. August 29, 1995, the Judge could 
not reasonably have been aware of Roller's knowledge and ability to testify. The matters 
the Judge should have inferred in Roller's favor include Roller's Affidavit, R. 200-231, 
Roller's Answers to Interrogatories, R. 232-297, and Roller's Supplemental Answers, R. 298-
346. This 146 pages of detailed information was all sworn to. The Judge only claimed to 
have read the memoranda, which ended on page 199. May one take offense that the Judge 
thinks speed reading his responsive Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment was 
adequate? This Memorandum, with exhibits A through E, is at R. 161-199. 
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TT ul tin Court reviewed the facts and all factual inferences in the light most 
24 through 26 of the Brief of Appellant Evan O. Koller. The Judge would have concluded 
by Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993), and met the standard for . 
testimony supported in Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 ( II Jtah 1982) I he (> , , ; ,<so 
iiLLiori Plaintiff asked for, dismissal, was too final and 
exceeded the guidelines of RUM, 3"Yb M'^ U.R.C.P., to only impose sanctions "as are just" 
I In 11 1 < ' n I " ""In • , J K i 
Motion to Compel, before any discovery conference contemplated b\ Kuie 26(f) L'.R.CP.. 
without also resolving all discovery issues, without anv t j before \ i 
! c-uicu conference. This independent discovery cut-off date only applied fox u^iwii 
to get expert testimony. Other relevant discovery had not yet concluded. This approach 
Health Care, 740 P.;\i :^« ; \ (I i.ti, \pp i l^\* ^ J H\ approved the sanction 
granting summary judgmei nil U] IIMIHVN mi iln ci\ i"u nl tn ill viihin nni1 wn.4 mi ilir iiu! 
setting. See pp. 29, 30 Brief <*t Appellant, Evan O. Koller. Berrett v. Denver A: 
R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2( 1 291 (I Jt. , \™ V <*ert. denied, • • ...: 
LiiiULiL'- __-i -.iUls, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976) also suggest a witness disclosure date after a 
pj-j-iri.i! conference, and after a broad review of the pleadings. These cases found trial 
|tnijj;t, jliiijvi> nl liikrii IIIIIII li i,il (Iriiif'il liiH»,nils thru lights \\\ i nproperly dismissing claims. 
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Had the Court reviewed the facts and all factual inferences in the light most 
favorable to him, and Roller's knowledge, Roller's efforts to obtain an expert, and the 
procedure phase of the case all suggest Summary Judgment was inappropriate. Since it was 
conditionally granted, an extension should have been allowed. The Trial Court should be 
reversed. 
II. THE JUDGE WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE DISPUTED FACTS BECAUSE 
HE HAD NOT READ THE AFFIDAVITS. 
The Judge apologized for being unprepared. He said he "looked at the file this 
morning for the first time. I didn't know I had it on my calendar". The issues framed by 
Roller's Counterclaim, insofar as this appeal is concerned, include whether the Plaintiff: 
(5) . . .was confused about several of the issues, was negligent in some 
of the work, and should not be compensated or was over-compensated for 
work. 
(6) . . .failed to adequately compare, complete, and follow-up proper 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree in the original 
1983 case before Judge Christofferson, which failure compounded the lawsuits 
and cost Defendant thousands of dollars in unnecessary legal fees, costs, and 
general damages. 
(7) . . .failed to adequately argue the law to the detriment of the 
Defendant, costing him delay, extra attorney fees, loss of rights and emotional 
distress for which Defendant is entitled to special and general damages. 
(8) . . .failed to raise certain issues and defenses which would have 
been to Defendant's advantage and likely would have saved time, saved 
attorney's fees, and improved the outcome, which resulted in Defendant's 
emotional distress, extra expense and loss of property, for which Defendant 
is entitled to special and general damages. 
(9) . . .had conflicts of interest that interfered with a zealous 
representation of the Defendant, causing the Defendant loss of time, loss of 
property, emotional distress, legal fees in excess of what should have been 
required, for which Defendant is entitled to special and general damages. 
(10) . . .failed to timely pursue some discovery issues, giving the other 
side time to sanitize records before the Defendant obtained them, all of which 
10 
was to the Defendant's detriment, and contributed to excess attorney fees, 
costs, delay and loss of property, for which Defendant is entitled to special 
and general damages. 
(11) . . .failed to enforce the Defendant's contract rights with respect 
to certain water rights and issues, which resulted in excess attorney fees, costs, 
delay, and loss of property, for which Defendant is entitled to special and 
general damages. 
(12) . . .failed to ask the trial and appellate court for attorney's fees 
from the other side, which was to Defendant's detriment and foreclosed the 
possibility of recovering some attorney fees, which failure to ask was noted by 
the District Court, and for which Defendant is entitled to offsets in an amount 
to be proven in Court, and general damages. 
(13) . . .failed to adequately and properly represent the Defendant in 
any and all of the heretofore alleged particulars for which the Defendant 
experienced mental distress, loss of time, illness caused by contaminated 
water, loss of property and excess attorney fees. 
(14) . . .in concert with others violated the Defendant's civil rights and 
denied the Defendant due process of law causing additional damages to 
Defendant. 
See Counterclaim, R. pp. 10, 11, 12. 
The word "malpractice" does not appear as such in the Counterclaim. The question 
before the Trial Court August 29,1995 should have been limited to whether the Defendant, 
considering the facts and inferences from facts most favorably to the Defendant, could 
materially dispute the Plaintiffs general denial of those allegations. To find out whether 
there are materially-disputed facts, Rule 56(c) requires the Court to conclude whether the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits fail to show a genuine issue 
of material fact. How can there be such a conclusion without a complete and attentive 
review? Instead, at this 11:00 a.m. hearing, the Judge said he had: 
. . . done some speed reading this morning between hearings, but I don't think 
I have reviewed more than half of what's there. I have reviewed all of the 
11 
memoranda, but the exhibits and the affidavits and the supporting 
documentation I've only partially worked through. R. 808, Line 21, et. seq. 
Any litigant deserves better than that! With the Trial Judge's admission he did not read the 
affidavits, the only argument to affirm is to sanction Koller for not providing a fully 
prepared and deposed expert by October 28, 1995. That sanction is too harsh. The result 
is to justify the Trial Court's apparent decision that expert testimony available after October 
28, 1995 is not soon enough. The real issue is whether there are facts and inferences that 
show malpractice, and there are. Just because the Judge did not read Roller's affidavits and 
answers to interrogatories to find this out does not mean the Trial Court can't be reversed. 
It should be. 
When the Trial Court dismissed most of Roller's Counterclaim, it abused its 
discretion by requiring that testimony and evidence of malpractice could only be offered by 
a licensed attorney, made available by a cut-off date unrelated to trial or discovery. In 
concluding this without reviewing Roller's affidavits, the Judge thought that the issues were 
too complex to permit this former client to testify. The Judge had a very incomplete 
understanding at the time of Roller's familiarity with the facts. Roller attempted to "fully 
prepare" an expert. He had one obtained, but not ready. The Court did not fairly consider 
the facts and inferences. He admitted he did not read them. Nothing in the response to 
motions filed later suggests he ever read them. Partial Summary Judgment for Plaintiff 
should be reversed. 
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III. PRESTON ARGUES FACTS WHICH PROVE THERE ARE MALPRACTICE 
ISSUES. 
Preston argues (Brief of Appellee, Page 5) he successfully defended Koller in the 
1983 trial against Cornish Town, respecting water rights from the Pearson and Griffith 
Springs, and that it was Koller who wanted to appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, to claim 
the Trial Court erred by allowing Cornish Town to connect Koller to the town water supply 
instead of using waters from the Pearson Spring. Appellee referred the Court to Cornish 
Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 920. Preston's argument is not correct. There would have been 
no need for an appeal if Preston had successfully represented Koller in the trial. Koller 
refused to accept the substitution of a source of inferior water for a source in which he held 
a vested right. In the 1983 trial, the court changed the source of Roller's water, to relieve 
the town of problems of delivering potable water. The complete transcript of this case was 
not obtained by Preston for this appeal, so Koller was faulted for not supplying it on appeal, 
Id. 922. Koller has now obtained it, and the full transcript is herewith offered to Preston 
and the Appeals Court. See the Trial Transcript February 16, 1983, pp. 619-625, 694, 695. 
Addendum Tab 1 in this Reply Brief has the relevant portions of the entire transcript. The 
entire transcript will be available for the trial on the malpractice issues. 
It was the Supreme Court of Utah which recognized and ruled that Koller could only 
reserve a right to use water to which he had deeded contract rights. Preston did not 
properly raise the issue in the Trial Court after being advised by Koller to do so. This 
necessitated the appeal. This point was reversed July 20,1988 for Koller after a lot of work. 
Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 920,921 (Utah 1988). Preston's inadequate representation 
in that trial is referred to in this case, R. pp. 204-210,11 16 - 26, in Evan Roller's Affidavit 
13 
dated August 18, 1995. This is part of the material the Trial Court did not review. Since 
it had not read the affidavit, the Trial Court could not make inferences favorable either to 
Roller's knowledge and ability to testify about these facts, or that Koller could present 
evidence of malpractice. 
In 1983 the District Court was misled and confused by Preston's failure to present 
pertinent records and to argue law regarding contract water rights as compared to 
appropriated water rights, and about state regulations pertaining to municipal water rights. 
The same Supreme Court decision was not so favorable for Koller in other ways, 
however. The Supreme Court held that Pearsons (Roller's predecessor) did not reserve the 
right to use water from the Cornish system. That really was not true. The Pearson Spring 
is part of the Cornish system. As a municipal system, it must comply with state regulations 
of public drinking water. Willard Hill, supervisor of environmental health for the Bear 
River District Health Department wrote in a letter November 14, 1978 to Gayle Smith, the 
State Division of Health that: 
This letter will confirm our telephone conversation of November 8, 1978 
concerning the Cornish water supply. . . 
On November 9th, I accompanied Mr. Evan Koller to the Pearson Spring and 
collected samples from the spring water and from the line, where the first 
connection is Mr. Koller's home. 
. . .At the time of the sampling we noted that a line from an open ditch was 
leading to the collection box which we feel was definitely contributing to the 
high coliform count we are experiencing on the Cornish system at the present 
time. (Emphasis supplied. Letter included in Addendum Tab 1.) 
The Town's attorney, William Fillmore, acknowledged in his opening statement for 
the town February 16, 1983 in the trial of Case 18267 before Judge Christofferson, that: 
The Deed also says that the Town agrees to pipe to the home of Lars Pearson 
this water. The Town agrees with that. It would acknowledge at the outset 
14 
that it has a duty to lay and maintain an appropriate water line to the Roller's 
house and is willing to do that if only an agreement can be reached with 
respect to the appropriate size of that pipe. (Trial Transcript p. 9, Line 10, 
included in Addendum Tab 1.) 
In his Brief in Case 19981 to the Supreme Court, of which this Court may take 
judicial notice, March 28, 1985, Mr. Fillmore argued, pp. 12-13: 
The Pearsons knew that the Town of Cornish was purchasing the spring for 
the development of the municipal culinary-quality water system, and it was 
that system of which they wanted to be part. The only fair and reasonable 
interpretation of the language of the deed is that the Town committed to 
supply Rollers with a 3/4-inch tap for culinary and domestic water, and the 
Town must determine how to get that water to them. 
This reasonable interpretation (that Cornish is to supply human drinking water) had already 
been made by the Court about this deed, at pp. 693-695 of its February 23, 1983 oral 
decision! (Trial Transcript pp. 693-695, esp. p. 694, Line 22, included in Addendum Tab 1). 
This shows that the Supreme Court ruling that Mr. Preston "obtained", wrongfully 
concluded Pearsons had not reserved the right to use water from the Cornish Town system. 
Cornish's own attorney argued the opposite of that conclusion! Preston failed to clearly and 
concisely state those facts, and to present the pertinent parts of the record and law regarding 
contract and appropriated water rights, misleading the Supreme Court. He also failed to 
include this matter completely in the District Court's findings. The Supreme Court noted 
Koller had "failed to provide the entire transcript of the proceedings below." Id. at 922. 
The Court did not reverse this part for that reason. Koller now has obtained the complete 
transcript and it is available for the "malpractice" trial. 
The District Court had actually taken evidence about the place where the Town of 
Cornish was to deliver water to Koller. It ruled from the bench in 1983 concerning this 
15 
Pearson Spring, that Koller was not an appropriator. Instead, the Court (Addendum Tab 
1, P. 693, Line 10) said: 
The water that he uses is appropriated by Cornish out of the tap. His only 
right is gained not as an appropriator but by the grant, again in the deed. 
. . .And, again, this is a grant of water to originally the Pearsons and I now 
make a finding, to their successors in interest to the property,. . . 
. . .He's entitled to what the use is that's stated in the grant, again: water to 
water his lawn, use in his house for whatever domestic purposes that they 
have. . . 
Now, there is no right to say where that diversion is to be made from 
Cornish's water to him. He's entitled to receive that water, but he's not 
entitled to say where he receives it from or to place in the pipe, and I do not 
think it is restricted solely to the source of water at Pearson's Spring. In fact, 
in order to comply with this, if they're to supply human drinking water, it may 
be . . . So I make the further finding that the Plaintiff (Cornish) is entitled 
to determine where that tap will be and to provide and pipe to a 3/4-inch tap 
to the home of--in this case it says Lars Pearson, but now it belongs to Mr. 
Koller, and I assume the appropriate place is, from the testimony-both 
parties talked of a box or someplace where everything goes out from the 
house, to the sprinklers, to the-I assume that's what it is from the testimony 
I've heard. (1983 Trial Transcript, p. 693-695, Addendum Tab 1.) 
Preston failed to clearly and concisely include these facts in the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. The omission gave rise to an illegal motion by Cornish 
Town to change the location of the service tap 1,500 feet upstream, which would have 
relieved the Cornish Town of the responsibility to deliver the water reserved to the Koller 
home, and would further limit Roller's access to the water by placing Roller's service tap 
in a pipe with zero pressure. This required the second appeal to the Supreme Court, 
Cornish Town v. Koller, 798 P.2d 753 (Utah 1990). This also cost lots of time, effort, worry 
and attorney fees. Damages to Rollers had multiplied. The portion of the Trial Court's 
decision dealing with the source of the water to be delivered was reversed by the Supreme 
Court (Id., at 757). Had Mr. Preston properly represented Koller in the first place, Roller 
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claims there would have been no illegal motion as to the location of the service tap serving 
the Koller home and no need for the second appeal to the Supreme Court. 
The Brief of Appellee acknowledges that Preston was arguably negligent in drafting 
the Findings and Conclusions of the Trial Court3, and thus recognizes there were actual 
material disputes of the adequacy of Preston's representation. This Court should recognize 
Koller could testify about this, and that he was also making reasonable efforts to get expert 
testimony. 
Paragraph 2(c), Page 5 of the Brief of Appellee quotes Roller's allegation that 
Preston failed to adequately present state regulations regarding water pressures and pipe 
sizes, but implies that presenting this was too much to expect of Mr. Preston. Mr. Koller 
discovered for himself that there were such regulations when visiting the office of the State 
Water Engineer. He copied the entire book, "State of Utah Public Drinking Water 
Regulations", and presented it to Mr. Preston in a looseleaf binder with notes on pertinent 
sections. Preston failed to use it. That Preston could have used this information, and in 
Roller's opinion should have used it, was also presented to the Trial Court in Roller's 
Affidavit, R. 210, 1124, 25, but not read by the Judge. 
At Page 6, sub-paragraph (d), Brief of Appellee, Preston claims he was successful in 
forcing Cornish to switch its complaint from "one of condemnation to one of perpetual 
easement of property".4 That is not true. Preston resisted the facts and law that would help 
3
 Page 5, Brief of Appellee, Line 11. 
4
 P. 6, Brief of Appellee, Lines 7-9. What Preston probably meant to write is 
that Cornish switched its complaint from a condemnation for a fee simple to 
a condemnation for an easement. This is the option stated in U.C.A.§78-34-2. 
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Koller. In a letter of March 22, 1986 to the Town of Cornish, Koller wrote: "How much 
control do you need over the areas in question?" "Do you need the oil and mineral rights? 
Hunting rights? Public access?" The Town advised Koller by letter July 14,1986 that it was 
"imperative" to obtain fee title. Then, U.C.A. §78-34-2 did not (and still does not) allow 
the condemnation of a protection zone in fee title. This issue, however, was not raised by 
Preston in the hearing for immediate occupancy in October 1986 until Koller reminded 
Preston of the issue of oil rights, mineral rights, hunting rights, etc. near the close of the 
hearing. This failure was raised in Evan Roller's Affidavit (R. 212, H33). Preston failed in 
that hearing to raise the statutory defense of which estates can be taken in a condemnation 
proceeding. See Footnote 4. Judge Christofferson noted it for him, however, and ruled 
during trial in 1988 that Cornish Town could not condemn a fee title for the right-of-way 
it was seeking. Preston either did not understand the law on condemnation, or chose not 
to raise the issue in the 1988 trial on the issues. In the Brief of Appellee, Page 17, 
Paragraph 9, Mr. Hanni writes: "The attorney is charged with knowing the law." Mr. Koller 
is able to recognize that Preston did not know it, and wrote about this to oppose the 
motion. The Trial Court did not read Roller's Affidavit. 
Koller raised many genuine issues of material fact by sworn statements the Trial 
Court ignored. Roller's own knowledge and observation enabled him to perceive that 
Preston did not know or apply the law efficiently for his client in several instances, some of 
which this brief refers to for examples. It was obvious to Mr. Koller when he prepared his 
affidavit these deficiencies had existed. Koller was not merely recalling them after he was 
sued, either. He referred to them in letters he wrote to Preston September 23, 1990, June 
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7, 1991, and August 13, 1991. These letters are in the Record at pp. 187, 189, and 194 
(Exhibit D, Defendant's Response to Motion) and Tab 2, Brief of Appellant. In the second 
letter (June 7, 1991, R. 189), Koller promised if Preston sued him he would file a 
malpractice suit in a counterclaim. Koller then proceeded to recite his reasons, listing his 
observations of Preston's legal failures. All three letters explain matters Koller thought to 
be failures of Preston to meet the appropriate standard of care, or of the legal system. 
There is no evidence the Trial Court considered Roller's familiarity with these cases, Roller's 
ability to speak on these issues, or reviewed these letters before it ruled August 29, 1995. 
So, it was not Mr. Preston who successfully represented Koller in forcing the Town 
of Cornish "to switch its complaint", unless the fact that Koller and the Trial Judge pushed 
him into it is reason to give him the credit. There should have been no need to raise the 
fee title defense in trial had Preston pointed out, before the 1988 trial at the 1986 hearing, 
that Utah Statutes simply do not allow condemnation of protection zones in fee title. See 
U.C.A. §78-34-2. The fact Cornish did not need fee title became overwhelmingly evident 
by the fact it amended its complaint to ask for an easement only. But, Preston failed to 
raise the defense at the October 1986 hearing for immediate occupancy, and did not come 
up with it himself in the 1988 trial. Koller pointed this out at his deposition in this case on 
May 10, 1993 (Deposition p. 65, Line 22). 
Preston did not disclose in advance the conflicts of interest referred to on Pages 6 
and 7 of Brief of Appellee. The conflicts became evident to Koller by Preston's actions 
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relevant to adverse litigants and his association with those litigants. Koller learned of the 
conflicts after the fact. He summarized them to the Trial Court August 18, 1995.5 
That there is a materially-disputed fact of whether Preston timely pursued discovery 
issues is ratified on Page 7 of the Brief of Appellee and in Roller's sworn allegations to the 
Trial Court, Page 226, 1145 of his August 18, 1995 Affidavit. Five years into the litigation 
and after the trial on the issues, a deputy sheriff at a town meeting suggested Rollers ought 
to obtain the records of the Town. When Koller approached Preston with the idea, Preston 
asked what the records would be needed for. Until that time, discovery was unheard of by 
Koller. Koller can now certainly testify what he found from those records, that he thinks 
Preston should have asked for them, and how it would have helped. If a deputy sheriff can 
appreciate the importance of records, and if Mr. Koller can explain their importance, a 
juror, even without another attorney testifying about discovery, can probably understand it 
also. 
These material facts were not recognized because the Trial Court had not read, much 
less analyzed, Roller's affidavit or sworn answers to interrogatories. There is no affidavit 
to refute Mr. Koller. 
It should not be too difficult for a jury to appreciate that attorney fees not asked for, 
R. 229,1152, 53, were waived. Koller can testify from the Court record that Judge Low said 
he would not allow attorney fees to be assessed because they had not been requested in the 
pleadings filed by Mr. Preston. 
See paragraph 42, R. 223 - 225, Affidavit of Evan Koller, August 18, 1995. 
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Favorable facts and inferences in this case which the Trial Court failed to make 
include that Koller was damaged by Mr. Preston's failures. It does not take expert 
testimony to show Roller's involvement in Court took him away from more pleasant things 
in life, his business, and his family. Roller's Counterclaim asked for offsets to claimed 
charges for errors in the bills and for work that generated the bill, as well as damages. As 
early as September 11, 1995, the Trial Court had Evan O. Roller's original deposition 
because Preston moved September 11,1995, R. 377, that the deposition become part of the 
record. On pages 58 and 59 of that deposition, Roller testifies that he understood these 
failures and believed them simple enough that he could testify about what he had a right 
to expect of Preston. 
Plaintiffs argument is that the Trial Court reviewed the facts and all inferences in 
a light most favorable to Roller, by speed reading memoranda. Preston relies on the Court's 
representation, made in the midst of its apology, that it had reviewed "all the memoranda". 
The Judge apologized for being unprepared. He said he "looked at the file this morning 
for the first time. I didn't know I had it on my calendar". His reference to speed-reading 
(R. 808, Line 22), applies to about half the file, to include the memoranda, but not the 
affidavits. Presumably his statement that he had partially worked through the affidavits and 
the supporting documentation yielded less understanding than speed reading the 
memoranda.6 
6
 The Court would have been offended had the Judge's and Roller's position 
been reversed. Everyone has a right to have their case given at least as much 
attention as a prudent person would give his own affairs. Where a judge is 
presiding, the litigant should expect a rule as clear as 56(c) to be carefully 
followed. 
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The Court's initial intention was to review all of the file before making a ruling, for 
the Judge said, "It's not likely that I'll be able to give you a decision this morning on the 
issue". (See R. 809, Lines 5-7.) The hearing was at 11:00 a.m. The Judge should not have 
pretended to understand a file having 346 pages of complex legal documentation, including 
affidavits, which he didn't know existed until that morning. He also dealt with other cases 
before that 11:00 a.m. hearing. The Court is expected to do justice, and didn't. If experts 
would eventually be required, would the Court accept the opinion of experts who did not 
have time to review the case and facts to which they testified? Probably not. After the 
hearing, Mr. Koller spent many days preparing, and at least four days in Salt Lake talking 
with experts trying to get them prepared. Finally realizing he could not meet the deadline, 
he asked for an extension, R. Motion 499, Memo, 501; Affidavit 505-508. The Trial Court 
erred in the initial ruling and in later refusing an extension. 
Without a careful review of Affidavits, the Trial Court thought an expert was 
essential because the issues would be too complex for non-attorneys. The Judge said that, 
even in understanding U.C.A. §78-34-2, possibly fifty percent of the licensed members of the 
bar would not "be qualified to address those issues, even though they're licensed attorneys", 
R. 826, Lines 3-11. From that he concluded Koller could not explain it either. Koller 
believes he can explain it. 
How does an attorney obtain background? Someone has to pay, or he has to donate 
his time. Are attorneys the only mortals with the mental capacity to understand a statute? 
People can represent themselves in Court Pro Se, and could even refer to statutes. Could 
a Pro Se litigant understand U.C.A. §78-34-2 and §78-34-4? These are short and relatively 
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simple statutes. Evan Koller had become acquainted with them. He could testify about 
them from his experience with one supposed "expert": the Plaintiff in this case! Section 
78-34-2(1) lists exactly when a fee simple estate can be taken. A simple reading of sub-
paragraphs (a) through (f) allows the easy conclusion that the purpose for which Cornish 
demanded Roller's ground is not on the list. Sub-section (2) says that only an easement can 
be taken for any other use. This is not too difficult to understand. An attorney does not 
have to explain it. A fair factual inference for Koller is that Koller could explain it. In the 
press of time at the hearing August 29, 1995, the Judge did not quote from this statute to 
explain why it is too hard for fifty percent of the lawyers to comprehend. It is just as simple 
to understand U.C.A. §78-34-4, which states, "Before property can be taken, it must appear 
that the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law, and that the taking is 
necessary to such use". This does not necessarily require an attorney expert to explain. Mr. 
Koller himself has significant experience, for which he paid dearly. 
Legislators, many of whom are non-lawyers, are allowed to understand, testify, and 
vote in the application of the statutes just discussed. A non-lawyer can understand their 
application, particularly if he had been involved in litigation concerning them, heard the 
statements of the judges and observed the omissions of his own counsel in the case. 
August 29, 1995, it was not possible for Koller to know how long it would actually 
take to interview a number of attorneys and find a lawyer qualified to testify about these 
and other issues. Preston had represented Koller for over nearly 20 years. To expect the 
expert to be "fully" prepared, a requirement the Plaintiff wrote later, added additional 
expectations. Roller's request for an extension of time was timely, reasonable and ignored. 
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Koller did retain an expert prior to the 60-day deadline, but the volume of material 
and schedule conflicts made it impossible for the available expert to be fully prepared and 
deposed by Roller's cut-off date. The Court and opposing counsel were notified of this 
October 24, 1995 by Evan Roller's Affidavit and counsel's letter, R. 505-508. 
Preston's attorney, Mr. Hanni, admitted he gratuitously added to the Order the 
requirement that the expert witness be "fully prepared" to express "final" opinions. This 
requirement was not in front of the Trial Court when Defendant's counsel thanked the 
Judge for the 60-day opportunity to provide the expert. After reasonable efforts to comply, 
it became apparent more time was needed, but Roller's reasonable extension request was 
refused. 
The portion of this case dealing with accounting is progressing. In fact, it is still in 
discovery. Judge Judkins is now assigned to the case; not Judge Hadfield. The disclosure 
by Mr. Preston of his accounting records-the subject about which he started this lawsuit-
was far from complete when Judge Hadfield made the expert witness discovery cut-off for 
Koller. Thus, time was not a critical factor. Preston finally produced on October 28, 1996, 
what he now claims is "a complete inventory of all records". That's right: one year after 
Koller was supposed to have his expert. It is document 107D, which would likely be page 
815 if the pleadings continued in sequence. Mr. Preston answered this way: 
Interrogatory 3: Set forth specifically all the reasons you have, if any, why the 
total of the payments you acknowledged in answering Interrogatory No. 3, 
Defendant's First Interrogatories, is not the $79,933.31 sworn to by George 
Preston November 8, 1993. 
Answer (By Mr. Preston): At the time of the commencement of this suit, all 
of the records had not been located and since November 8, 1993, a complete 
inventory of all records of Preston & Chambers has been assembled and is 
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included in the attached documents. The total payments by the Defendants 
to the Plaintiff as acknowledged in our records is the sum of $91,244.09. 
(Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's Fourth Set of Interrogatories and Request 
for Production of Documents, Signed October 28, 1996, by George W. 
Preston.) 
Four years earlier, September 1,1992, Preston's attorney, Thomas L. Willmore, told 
Roller's counsel he had in his possession (and he delivered) "all of the billings concerning 
the various lawsuits", R. 199. A copy of that letter was available with Roller's Memorandum 
to the Trial Judge when Koller argued (August 29, 1995) that expert testimony should not 
be required yet, because discovery was incomplete. Preston himself provided his latest 
billings four years after September 1992. Koller was right: relevant discovery was 
incomplete. 
Plaintiff had the burden of proving the balance claimed from Koller, and Preston still 
hasn't made a prima facie case. One year after Koller should have had his malpractice 
expert, Preston is still coming up with billing records. What is wrong with granting Koller 
the extension of time to obtain an expert to supplement his own testimony about facts the 
Trial Court failed to infer in his favor? For that matter, what is wrong with reversing the 
Partial Summary Judgment because it was premature? 
Plaintiffs argument, Brief of Appellee, Page 13, Paragraph 10, that Koller did not 
retain an expert by October 28, 1995 is unfounded. In Roller's October 24, 1995 Affidavit, 
supporting his Motion for an Extension of Time to get an expert, Koller asked for an 
extension of time because Jeffrey W. Appel could not be ready in the time allotted, R. 506, 
117. The expert had become involved, if not fully prepared. Appellee's Brief fails totally to 
recognize any effort Koller made. Yet, Koller spent time, spent money, reviewed records 
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and met with many people by the time his affidavit was prepared. Preston's argument that 
Koller ignored the Court's Order, fails. 
CONCLUSION 
As he defended against Preston's claim for more money, Koller counterclaimed 
Preston had already been paid too much and that Preston should give Koller a refund 
because he hadn't done his work adequately. Preston was still searching his records for a 
beginning point from which to justify his claim for more money. He still has not found it, 
but he finally said he produced all his billing records-one year after Koller was supposed 
to have his expert fully prepared and deposed. 
It is reasonable that Koller have additional time to get expert testimony to use with 
Roller's own testimony about the malpractice issues. Koller made reasonable efforts to 
comply with the Court's Order. The Order was an abuse of discretion because Koller set 
forth facts the Trial Court did not consider, facts from which inferences should have been 
made that Koller could prevail on malpractice issues. 
A litigant with extensive first-hand knowledge of a case and its circumstance should 
be able to testify, to produce documents, and to recite what happened in Court proceedings 
and in conferences with his prior counsel. Koller was knowledgeable about these things, and 
able to write the letters that begin in the Record at Pages 189 and 194. As a lay person, he 
understood the factual history of certain legal work by Preston. It is reasonable that a jury 
could also appreciate what Koller expected, and why he expected it, from Roller's testimony. 
If Roller's testimony would not have as much weight as that of an expert, that is a risk 
Koller should be allowed to assume. But, he should not be denied the inferences to which 
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he is entitled on Summary Judgment. His affidavits show there were genuine issues as to 
material facts about Preston's malpractice. He did obtain an expert, and tried to have him 
fully prepared and deposed. Meanwhile, Plaintiff did not produce all accounting records 
for another year! 
That there was outstanding discovery at the time was pointed out to the Judge, R. 
820, 821. How could an expert be fully prepared with final opinions when discovery had not 
ended? The Court's ruling August 29, 1995 did nothing to advance a trial date. The Court 
did not have a pre-trial conference or try to set a date. Other things have delayed the trial, 
not the least of which is that Plaintiff is still trying to demonstrate a defensible beginning 
point to justify its Complaint. 
The Court did not read Kollef s affidavits or sworn interrogatory answers August 29, 
1996, did not consider them seriously afterwards, and did not consider the requirements of 
Rule 56(c)(2) when it denied Roller his reasonable inferences. A former client ought to be 
able to testify how documents and discovery were, or were not, obtained and to refer to a 
Court record for statements the Judge said were obvious. He ought to be able to ask 
questions about the necessity of legal work. He ought to be able to state his interpretation 
of the Utah statutes, which statutes do not require lawyers to write, and state what is 
obvious in them. He ought to have reasonable time to fully prepare and depose an expert 
to assist. That "reasonable time" should be rationally related to other discovery, to a pre-
trial conference and to a trial date. 
As a non-lawyer, Koller also ought to be able to refer to city water system regulations 
which are not written only for lawyers. He ought to be able to ask, in a trial, why an expert 
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in water law was not obtained by his own counsel, Preston, where the case involved water 
rights and water law. The answer expected is that Mr. Preston said Koller did not need his 
own expert, but he (Preston) could use the Town's expert and save Koller money. The Brief 
of Appellee says a lawyer should know the law. That could apply to Preston. For the Trial 
Judge to rule, without considering all the sworn testimony from Koller, that the only way 
to present evidence Preston did not meet its duty of care is through a lawyer's testimony, 
was an abuse of discretion. Koller presented enough facts to show there are malpractice 
issues. He is entitled to inferences that a person not licensed as an attorney could testify 
about at least some of those issues. As to matters that actually require an expert, Koller 
made reasonable progress in getting one. 
Neither the Court nor Preston should be concerned about delay in the case because 
Preston is not, yet, ready for trial. Preston's disclosure, finally, of "a complete inventory of 
all records" one full year after Koller was supposed to have experts fully prepared and 
deposed prove Koller was right: discovery wasn't complete. On September 1, 1992, Mr. 
Willmore, Preston's previous counsel, said: "I have received from the lawfirm of Preston 
& Chambers all of the billings concerning the various lawsuits when Mr. Preston represented 
Mr. and Mrs. Koller", R. 199. How incomplete that was! How reasonable is the relief 
sought now by Evan Koller. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Trial Court should be reversed on its refusal to allow Koller an extension of time 
to obtain an expert. The Trial Court should be reversed on its decision to grant Partial 
Summary Judgment. The Trial Court could be reversed on its ruling that Koller must have 
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expert testimony about all claims about the duty of care owed by Preston. The Appeals 
Court could shorten the case by removing some of the accounting issues, and granting 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that Defendant overpaid the principal 
amount claim by at least $11,669.78. For the sake of Defendant's Partial Summary 
Judgment, this figure assumes the validity of Plaintiffs claim. The Appeals Court should 
grant Koller his attorney fees on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of January, 1997. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 31st day of January, 1997, two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing, REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT EVAN O. KOLLER, were mailed postage 
prepaid to the following: 
Mr. Glenn C. Hanni 
Mr. Peter H. Christensen 
Attorneys at Law 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Order, March 18, 1996 682-683 
Memorandum Decision, February 21, 1996 679-680 
Memorandum Decision, February 5, 1996 676-677 
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Certification, January 11, 1996 628-633 
Order Re: Dismissal, January 11, 1995 626-627 
Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Appel, December 14, 1995 587-594 
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December 13, 1995 567-568 
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for Rule 54(b) Certificate, December 13, 1995 569-576 
Memorandum Decision, November 22, 1995 563-566 
Evan Roller's Reply to Objection to Defendant's 
Motion for Hearing, November 3, 1995 560 
Motion for Hearing, October 30, 1995 547 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Extension of Time, October 24, 1995 501-504 
Defendant and Counterclaimant's Motion 
for Extension of Time to Provide Expert 
Witnesses, October 24, 1995 499-500 
Affidavit of Evan Roller, October 11, 1995 481-496 
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Counter-Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Defendant's Counterclaim, October 11, 1995 456-480 
Response to Motion to Publish Deposition, October 9, 1995 454 
Defendant's Response Opposing Partial Summary 
Judgment, September 22, 1995 442-444 
Partial Summary Judgment, September 25, 1995 439-441 
Order to Publish Evan O. Roller's Answers to 
Interrogatories with Exhibits, September 13, 1995 422-423 
Ray Malouf letter to First District Court Clerk, 
August 21, 1995 Not in Record 
Objection to Form of Partial Summary Judgment 
and Motion for Hearing, September 11, 1995 412-413 
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CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM EXHIBITS - BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. Exhibit: Record Page No. 
1. Affidavit of Evan Roller, August 18, 1995 
(Opposing Summary Judgment, $99,335.52 was paid; specific 
failures to do certain legal work.) R 200-231 
2. Exhibits A through E to Affidavit and Memorandum, 
August 18, 1995 R 175-199 
A. Summons (October 14, 1992, issued late) R 176 
B. Plaintiffs Interrogatory Answers, November 8, 1993 
admitting only $79,933.31 received R 177-183 
C. Letter from Defendant's attorney December 7, 1994, 
informal discovery continuing R 185 
D. Letters from Koller to Preston 
September 23, 1990 R 187 
June 7, 1991 R 189 
August 13, 1991 R 194 
E. Letter from Plaintiffs attorney September 1, 1992 
("all of the billings") R 199 
3. Partial Transcript August 29, 1996 
(Judge did not read affidavits) R 807-809, 825-828 
4. September 25, 1995 Order, ("fully" prepared with 
"final" opinions was added) R 439-440 
5. Motion, Memorandum, and Affidavit for Extension of Time 
to Provide Expert Witness, October 24, 1995 
(could not fully prepare, despite diligent efforts) R 499-508 
6. Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Appel, December 14, 1995 
(Duty of care probably not met in specific matters. "It appears 
Preston made some mistakes...") R 587-594 
7. Memorandum Decisions, 
November 22, 1995 R 563-566 
February 5, 1996 R 676-677 
February 21, 1996 R 679-680 
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RECORD ON APPEAL 
The Record in this case should include: 
Volume 1 1-231 
Volume 2 232-533 
Volume 3 534-806 
Transcript August 29, 1995 807-8291 
Deposition of Evan Koller, May 10, 1993 Tr. 1-832 
These page numbers have been used by both parties on appeal. The Trial 
Court file has additional pleadings now. 
The deposition, Pages 1-83, without Exhibits 1-9 (containing 49 pages), is 
included in Brief of Appellee in Exhibit Tab 3. Referencing the transcript by 
these page numbers is appropriate because the Trial Court did not paginate 
the original. The original deposition should still be included with the record. 
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Addendum 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
CORNISH TOWN, ) 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
CIVIL NO. 18267 
-VS- ) REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
OF PROCEEDINGS 
EVAN KOLLER S MARLENE KOLLER, ) PP. 1 - 188 
DEFENDANTS. ) 
TRIAL HELD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT AND 
CAUSE ON FEBRUARY 16 1983, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 10:30 
A. M., BEFORE THE HON. VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, DISTRICT JUDGE, 
PRESIDING WITHOUT A JURY. 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF OLSON, HOGGAN S SORENSEN 
WILLIAM FILLMORE, ESQ. 
56 WEST CENTER ST. 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS PRESTON AND HARRIS 
GEORGE W. PRESTON, ESQ. 
31 FEDERAL AVENUE 
LOGAN, UTAH 8'+3 21 
GEORGE A. PARKER, CSR-CM 
559 EAST 1150 NORTH 
LOGAN, UTAH 8<f3'H 
PH. 752-5394 
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1 II THE COURT: RIGHT. 
2
 MR. FILLMORE: IN OTHER WORDS, THE AUTHENTICITY 
3
 IS STIPULATED TO SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION BY THE COURT. 
4
 PLAINTIFF HAS ALSO FILED AN AMENDED COMPLAINT HEREIN RECENT-
5
 LY PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT WITH COUNSEL. PART OF THAT AGREE-
6
 MENT IS T H A T DEFENDANTS1 ATTORNEY NEED NOT FILE AN ANSWER 
7 TO THAT AMENDED COMPLAINT, IT'S DEEMED DENIES IN ALL PARTIC-
8 ULARS. FURTHERMORE, I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT THAT WE SPECIFY 
9 AT THE OUTSET WHAT ISSUES WE ARE NOT ADDRESSING IN THIS CASE 
10 THERE ARE SEVERAL THINGS WHICH WE DISCUSSED AT THE PRETRIAL 
11 CONFERENCE WHICH HAVE BEEN EX.PRESSLY RESERVED FOR A LATER 
12 DATE POSSIBLY WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO EITHER PARTY. THOSE 
13 ISSUES WOULD INCLUDE POLLUTION MATTERS, THE QUESTION OF ANY 
INJUNCTION WITH RESPECT TO NITRATE POLLUTION IN THE PEARSON 
SPRING OR GRIFFIFTHS SPRING, QUESTIONS AS TO THE POLLUTION 
„c ,, MATTERS SUPERVISED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. THOSE lb 
17 || ARE ALL RESERVED, AS WELL AS ANY POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION 
18 ACTIONS WHICH THE TOWN LATER MAY DESIRE TO BRING 
1 9 II I THINK AT THE OUTSET I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATE-
MENT, YOUR HONOR, AND TRY TO PUT INTO FOCUS THE MATTERS THAT 
WE'RE ASKING THE COURT TO RESOLVE IN LIGHT OF THE PARTIES' 
14 
15 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
INABILITY TO REACH A RESOLUTION AMONG THEMSELVES. AS IT SEE 
IT, THERE ARE TWO TYPES OFFJUES^ BEFORE THE COURT AND ONLY TWO 
TYPES OF ISSUES. ONE IS THE WATER RIGHTS OF THE RESPECTIVE 
25 PARTIES IN AND TO THE PEARSON SPRING AND THE GRIFFITHS SPRING. 
-7-
TOWN OF CORNISH. I SHOULD SAY BY WAY OF BACKGROUND THAT THE 
PEARSON SPRING HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE STATE ENGINEER'S 
OFFICE AS A PRE-1905 DILIGENCE RIGHT. THE PEARSON FAMILY 
OWNED EVERY DROP OF WATER BY VIRTUE OF THAT DILIGENCE CLAIM 
IN AND TO THE PEARSON SPRING. COME 1937, LARS PEARSON, SR., 
HAVING DIED, HIS WIDOW EXECUTED A DEED WHICH IS ONE OF THE 
EXHIBITS THAT'S BEEN STIPULATED CONVEYING ALL OF THE WATER 
RIGHTS THAT SHE ENJOYED -- LET ME SCRATCH THAT AND START OVER 
CONVEYING HER INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY WHICH SHE OWNED, WHICH 
WAS ESSENTIALLY THE -- HOW BEST TO DESCRIBE IT? IN A BROAD 
STROKE, THIS-AREA IN HERE (INDICATING). PEARSONS DID NOT OWN 
THIS AREA UP ABOVE IN THE PEARSON SPRING, IT WAS CALLED THE 
PEARSON SPRING BECAUSE THEY'D USED THE WATER FOR OVER 40 
YEARS, BUT THEY DID NOT OWN THE LAND UP HERE, THEY OWNED IT 
DOWN BELOW, TOWARDS THE COUNTY ROAD. SHE CONVEYED ALL OF HER 
RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST TO THE LAND IN 1937 TO HER FIVE 
REMAINING CHILDREN. THERE'S LANGUAGE IN THERE WITH RESPECT 
TO APPURTENANT WATER RIGHTS.. 
IN 1938, MRS. PEARSON, WHO RESERVED A LIFE ESTATE 
TO THE PROPERTY AND, BY IMPLICATION, THE WATER, AND FOUR OF 
HER FIVE CHILDREN DEEDED ALL OF THEIR RIGHTS IN AND TO THE 
PEARSON SPRING TO THE TOWN OF CORNISH. SO WE HAVE MRS. PEAR-
SON, WHO WILL BE REFERRED TO THROUGHOUT THESE PROCEEDINGS AS 
EMMA PEARSON, CONVEYING ALL OF HER LIFE ESTATE IN AND TO THE 
WATER AND WATERWORKS AROUND PEARSON SPRING TO THE TOWN, AND 
-9-
1 II SHOULD BE READ LITERALLY, THAT THE THREE-QUARTER-1NCH TAP 
2 MEANS A THREE-QUARTER-INCH TAP, WHICH IS THE STANDARD RESIDEN 
3 TIAL HOOKUP IN CORNISH AND THROUGHOUT THIS VALLEY, A 3/4-INCH 
4 TAP FOR RESIDENTIAL, AS THE DEED SAYS, CULINARY AND DOMESTIC 
5 PURPOSES. NO MORE AND NO LESS. THAT KIND OF TAP I'M 
6 INFORMED TYPICALLY YIELDS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF SIX TO EIGHT 
7 GALLONS PER MINUTE. 
8 THE RESERVATION OF USE IS IMPORTANT. IT'S LIMITED 
9 STRICTLY TO CULINARY AND DOMESTIC PURPOSES AND SOME STOCK-
10 WATERING. THE DEED ALSO SAYS THAT THE TOWN AGREES TO PIPE TO 
11 THE HOME OF LARS PEARSON THIS-WATER. THE TOWN AGREES WITH 
12 THAT. IT WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE AT THE OUTSET THAT IT HAS A DUTY 
13 TO LAY AND MAINTAIN AN APPROPRIATE WATERLINE TO THE KOLLERS' 
14 HOUSE AND IS WILLING TO DO THAT IF ONLY AN AGREEMENT CAN BE 
15 REACHED WITH RESPECT TO THE APPROPRIATE SIZE OF THAT PIPE. 
16 THE PIPE INTSELF WAS CONSTRUCTED IN 1939; IT WAS A W.P.A. PROJ 
17 JECT. THERE IS SOME DISPUTE WHICH WILL BE BROUGHT OUT SOONER 
18 OR LATER AS TO THE SIZE OF.THAT PIPE. THE TOWN CONTINUES TO 
19 BELIEVE THAT THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE AND WAS A 3/4-INCH LINE. 
20 THERE WILL BE SOME TESTIMONY TO THE EFFECT T1HAT IT WAS A ONE-
21 INCH LINE. ALSO THERE WILL BE TESTIMONY TO THE EFFECT THAT 
22 MR. KOLLER AND/OR HIS PREDECESSORS HAVE INSTALLED LATERAL 
23 LINES OFF OF THAT. MAYBE I COULD -- WE HAVEN'T DRAWN THIS 
24 IN BECAUSE WE'LL LET MR. KOLLER DO THAT, BUT HIS EXISTING 
25 LINE ESSENTIALLY COMES SOMETHING LIKE THIS, YOUR HONOR, FROM 
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TIIE COUPT: Okay. 
Q (by Viv. Preston) Mr. Hansen indicated that you 
should be very happy to be entitled to be hooked on or 
connected to the Cornish water supply because the question 
was asked to him, "Is there any doubt in your mind that the 
water was in the town's main pipe as it runs by Evan Koller's 
house is healthier and higher quality water than that which 
reaches his tap to the west of his house?" 
I111 ask you this question: Are you willing, to 
exchange the present water system you have for a connection 
in front of your house at the city water main? 
A I refuse to exchange our present rights for that 
hookup in front. 
Q And would you give the court the reasons why you 
do not want to be hooked to the city water supply? 
A I certainly will. I've thought this thing through 
carefully. Number one: It's contrary to the deed or the 
contract which we have with Cornish. The deed reads that 
we reserve the right in one certain spring. Not in a well, 
not in the drains that come down below Pitcher's corrals 
and stuff that Cornish used to pump into the linos, not in 
some other system, but "we reserve the right in one certain 
spring.fl 
It further says in that deed that Cornish agrees 
to pipe said water to the home of Lars Pearson, which is 
- 147 -
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our subsequent rights. 
Q Okay. Now then— 
A And further—do you want me to go on down through 
these? 
Q Yes. 
A Further, as has been demonstrated here in court 
this day, whereas we How have prior rights to this water, 
prior to Cornish, they reserved these rights to themselves, 
if we go on that line in front then we get last rights to 
that water. We'll get water if everybody else in Cornish 
has got water, but if they run out or if they draw that 
pressure low we will have no water at all. 
In fact, if you look at the geological map which 
they introduced into this court, the elevations are such 
between the top end of the Cornish line and our home, 
there's an inch to a hundred twenty feet in difference. If 
they get low on the top end of that line, and as they have 
indicated they often do, when we open our taps in our house, 
at that time they'll suck air and they1IT literally suck 
the water out of our house to service the rest of Cornish. 
I do not want—I'll refuse to trade prior rights for last 
rights. 
Q Okay. Next item. 
A Poor quality water is my next objection. The 
water which they are pumping out of that well is high in 
- 148 -
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arsenic, it's high in iron, it's high in flourides, it's 
high in sulfur, it's high in manganese, it does not meet 
state specs in several respects alone. You might can mix 
it with some other water, but that' s just like mixing rotten 
eggs with good eggs and saying that a cake made out of 
half rotten eggs and half good eggs is okay. 
If I was to be putting arsenic in Cornish's 
system up there in any amount whatsoever, they would object. 
MR. FILLMORE: I have an objection to this line 
of questioning if he's testifying as an expert as to what's 
in that water. I don't believe we have any foundation 
for some of these things. 
MR. PRESTON: Oh, yes, you do. You put the 
exhibit in yourself, counselor, as one of the many exhibits 
from the State Health Department showing exactly the content 
of the water. 
MR. FILLMORE: We have the one exhibit which 
indicates some arsenic which is in acceptable limits, and 
iron which is in acceptable limits, and that's all that's 
in the record. 
THE COURT: All right. tie's saying that whatever 
is in the record, and it shows, he doesn't like, obviously, 
MR. FILLMORE: Right. Rut he's going far beyond 
the record. 
Q Okay, the next objection. 
- 14° -
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requires a one and a quarter-inch line to service that 
fire hydrant. With low pressure it too won't function. 
The ones in the yards won't function. V/e value that pressure 
which we have off of our present hookup very highly. 
Q And are you willing at this time to enter into 
any kind of a trade or any kind of an arrangement in which 
you'd substitute what you have presently for a hookup in 
front of the home on the city main? 
A No way. 
MR. PRESTON: No further questions. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MP. riLTi^ ORK: 
Q Mr. Keller, you bought the Pearson property in 
1?60; is that right? 
A V/e took possession of it in the fall of 1°5°. 
Q The deed was signed in early f60. Okay, When 
was the last time the Butlers lived in that house? 
A I don't really know. 
Q Hadn't lived there for several years though, had 
they, when you bought it? 
A The Butlers? 
Q Butlers or Pearsons or anybody. 
A .Butlers sold it to Pearson is my best recollection, 
but I'm not clear ox] this, back in 1 °28 or somewhere there, 
I have no knowledge of that. 
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EXCEPT FOR THE NECESSITY OF THOSE PARTICULAR THINGS THAT 
I'VE ENUMERATED, HE HAS NO RIGHT TO DO THAT. I OF COURSE 
CAN'T PUT IN THE DECREE THAT THE JUDGE WILL GO UP AND WATCH 
THE PLACE TWENTY-FOUR HOURS A DAY TO SEE HE DOESN'T WASTE 
ANY WATER, BUT I ASSUME THAT THIS CAN BE SHOWN BY CORNISH, 
THAT THE USES TO WHICH HE PUTS IT IS A WASTE OF WATER, THEY 
CAN IN SOME WAY RESTRICT THAT TIME OF USE BY INJUNCTION WITH 
CONTEMPT PROVISIONS OR WHATEVER. 
PEARSON SPRING. THE TAP. THE SAME SITUATION. 
HE'S NOT AN APPROPRIATOR. THE WATER THAT HE USES IS APPROPRI-
ATED BY CORNISH OUT OF THE TAP. HIS ONLY RIGHT IS GAINED NOT 
AS AN APPROPRIATOR BUT BY THE GRANT AGAIN IN THE DEED, WHICH 
I ASSUME OR WILL STATE AS A FINDING THAT THE INTENT IT 
APPEARS OF THE PARTIES THAT THIS WAS TO BE APPURTENANT TO 
THE PROPERTY AND THAT THE PEARSONS DIDN'T INTEND, IF THEY 
SOLD IT, TO TELL THE PEOPLE THEY SOLD IT TO THAT THEY WERE 
GOING TO GET THE WATER SHUT OFF, AND I DON'T BELIEVE CORNISH 
HAD THE IDEA THAT THIS WAS TO BE THE CASE OF A TERMINATION 
ON TRANSFER EITHER, AND WOULD MAKE THE SAME FINDING. 
AND, AGAIN, THIS IS A GRANT OF WATER TO ORIGINALLY 
THE PEARSONS AND, I NOW MAKE A FINDING, TO THEIR SUCCESSORS 
IN INTEREST TO THE PROPERTY, A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF WATER FOR 
DRINKING, STOCKWATERING PURPOSES, AND CULINARY AND DOMESTIC 
PURPOSES, WHICH DOESN'T INCLUDE THE FISH POND, BY THE WAY. 
IT DOES INCLUDE WATERING WHAT PLANTS, SHRUBS, LAWNS, STOCK, 
9 
10 
11 
12 
-694-
1 II PUTTING WATER IN YOUR TRUCKS AND CAR AND WHATEVER YOU GENER-
2 ALLY USE AROUND THERE, THE SAME WAY AS I BELIEVE ONE OF THE 
3
 WITNESSES TESTIFIED OFF OF HIS DOMESTIC SUPPLY HE TAKES OUT 
4
 AND WATERS HIS COWS AND CLEANS HIS DAIRY EQUIPMENT AND EVEN 
5
 STORES SOME WATER THERE FOR THAT PURPOSE, AND I SEE NOTHING 
6
 WRONG WITH THAT. THAT'S A PROPER DOMESTIC AND CULINARY USE. 
7 IT IS NOT RESTRICTED, AGAIN, BY GALLONS PER MINUTE, 
8
 || FOR EXAMPLE. I THINK ONE OF YOU STATED, FIGURED OUT 46,000 
GALLONS, WHATEVER THAT FIGURE WAS, WOULD GO IF YOU LEFT IT 
CONTINUALLY OPEN AND — BUT THAT ISN'T WHAT HE'S ENTITLED TO. 
HE'S ENTITLED TO WHAT THE USE IS THAT'S STATED IN THE GRANT, 
AGAIN: WATER TO WATER HIS LAWN, USE IN HIS HOUSE FOR WHAT-
13 || EVER DOMESTIC PURPOSES THAT THEY HAVE. IT'S NOT TO BE USED -
14 AND I THINK I'VE ENUMERATED MOST OF THEM — IT CERTAINLY 
15 ISN'T FOR AGRICULTURE, BUT IT'S RESTRICTED BY THAT USE. 
16 NOW, THERE IS NO RIGHT AS TO SAY WHERE THAT DIVER-
17 || SION IS TO BE MADE FROM CORNISH'S WATER TO HIM. HE'S EN-
TITLED TO RECEIVE THAT WATER, BUT HE'S NOT ENTITLED TO SAY 
WHERE HE RECEIVES IT FROM OR TO PLACE IN THE PIPE, AND I DO 
20
 || NOT THINK IT'S RESTRICTED SOLELY TO THE SOURCE WATER OF 
21
 || PEARSON SPRING. IN FACT, IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THIS, IF 
THEY'RE TO SUPPLY HUMAN DRINKING WATER, IT MAY BE THAT THE 
23 || SOURCE OF SUPPLY JUST OUT OF PEARSON'S WITHOUT IT GOING 
24
 || THROUGH THEIR FILTRATION AND CHLORINATING AND WHAT OTHER 
25
 " SYSTEM THEY HAVE TO DO TO PASS HEALTH STANDARDS THEY COULDN'T 
COMPLY BY TAKING IT WITH PROVIDING HIM THE WATER. SO I MAKE 
18 
19 
22 
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A FURTHER FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO DETER-
MINE WHERE THAT TAP WILL BE AND TO PROVIDE AND PIPE TO A 3/4-
INCH TAP TO THE HOME OF — IN THIS CASE IT SAYS LARS PEAR-
SON, BUT NOW IT BELONGS TO MR. KOLLER, AND I ASSUME THE 
APPROPRIATE PLACE IS, FROM THE TESTIMONY -- BOTH PARTIES 
TALKED OF A BOX OR SOME PLACE WHERE EVERYTHING GOES OUR FROM 
TO THE HOUSE, TO THE SPRINKLERS, TO THE — I ASSUME THAT'S 
WHAT IT IS FROM THE TESTIMONY I'VE HEARD. 
FURTHER FIND THAT PEARSON SPRING WATER SUPPLY IS 
GOVERNED BY THE COLLECTION BASIN — OR NOT JUST THE BOX, BUT 
THE BASIN OUTLINED IN BLUE BY DR. HANSEN AS TO WHERE THE 
WATER SOURCE IS AND IS NOT ONE SINGLE SPRING BUT MAY BE COM-
POSED OF SEVERAL SPRINGS. I STATE THIS FOR THE PURPOSE, AND 
MAKE THIS A FINDING, FOR THE PURPOSE OF WHAT MAY HAPPEN TO 
WATER RIGHTS TO THAT SPRING, AND AS I TOLD YOU THIS MORNING 
I'M GOING TO RESERVE A DECISION TO THAT ONE POINT. 
CORNISH DID PURCHASE FOUR-F IFTKS, AND I BELIEVE 
EVERYBODY AGREES, OF WHATEVER THOSE .RIGHTS WERE, AND MR. 
KOLLER PURCHASED THE ONE-FIFTH INTEREST OF MARIE DOBBS. 
NOW, IT'S THE POSITION OF CORNISH SHE DID NOT HAVE ANYTHING 
LEFT TO TRANSFER BY REASON OF SOME TYPE OF FORFEITURE, AND 
I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO READ YOUR AMENDED COMPLAINT, I'M 
NOT EVEN SURE OF YOUR THEORY. I THOUGHT FIRST IT WAS ABAN-
DONMENT, BUT YOU SAY YOU HAVE A DIFFERENT ONE, SO AS TO 
THAT POINT — AND I WOULD MAKE A FINDING THAT IF SHE HAD LOSTJ 
THE RIGHTS AND HAD NO RIGHTS, OF COURSE SHE CAN'T TRANSFER 
i ^ ^ s& at. 
BEAR R I V E R D I S T R I C T H E A L T H DEPARTMENT 
170 NORTH MAIN STREET 
LQGAN, UTAH 8 4 3 2 1 
J O H N C. BAILEY. M. O. 
O I R C C T Q H or H E A L T H 
November 14, 1978" 
IBQll 7 5 2 - 3 7 3 Q 
Mr. Gayle Smith ~ - •-' «!>J/J 
Bureau of Water Works 
State Division of Health ;' •'•••••- ... 
P.O. Box 2500 ••*-".-^.-.?t. ...,..V;'" 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Dear Mr. Smith, 
This letter will confirm our telephone conversation of November 
8, 1978, concerning the Cornish Water supply. As stated in our tele-
phone conversation we are very concerned about the reported radio-
activity of this particular source, (Pearson Spring). 
CG-^A r v A 
As you know we have submitted samples from each of the three 
sources of water used by Cornish. 1. Pearson Spring, 2. Griffin 
Spring, 3. Pump well. We have had some conversation with Dr. Mecham 
of the State Radiological lab and he states that he is not able at 
this- time to make a definite analysis of the radio activity^of the 
samples submitted because of a breakdown in equipment, but that he 
feels there is definitely some cause for concern. 
On November 9th I accompanied Mr. Evan Kohler to the Pearson 
Spring and collected samples from the spring water and from the line, 
where the firsX connection is Mr. Kohlers home. These samples were 
submitted to the Utah State University lab but their equipment was not 
sophisticated enough to make a definite analysis. At the time of the 
sampling we noted that a line ^^m_^n^£pen ditch was leading to the 
collection box which we feel was definitely contributing to the high .^Tv 
coliform count we are experiencing on the Cornish system at the 7>,.-r^trt v %w. 
present time. 
We are real concerned at this time and request the resources 
of the State pivision of Health to help us investigate this problem. 
We respectively request that you follow up the testing of the 
radio activity of the Pearson Spring source by the E.P.A. at Denver. 
Please notify the Bear River Health Department when we may have 
a member of your staff help us investigate this problem. 
Sincerely, 
'
%
"^ ,4i r 
/l*L MaMJy^/sJul 
Willard K. Hill, R.S. 
Supervisor, Environmental Health 
WKH:sl 
State of Utah 
Department of Health 
Division of Environmental Health 
Bureau of Public Water Supplies 
S T A T E O F U T A H 
P U B L I C D R I N K I N G W A T E R R E G U L A T I O N S 
Part I - Administrat ive Rules 
and 
Part II - Design and Construction Standards 
These regulations were adopted by the Utah Safe 
Drinking Water Committee under the authority of 
Utah Code Annotated Section 26-12-5 (1953) as Amended 
Original adoption on October 18, 1979 
1st Revision adopted August 28, 1980 
2nd Revision adopted June 25, 1981 
3rd Revision adopted April 16, 1984 
Robert B. Hilbert, Chairman 
Utah Safe Drinking Water Committee 
Michael J^tapley 
Acting Executi>^ Director 
Utah atajte Department of Health 
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1.9 DEFINITIONS 
mmmmmmmmmmm 
The following definitions apply to this section: 
Approval - Unless indicated otherwise, shall be taken to mean a written 
statement of acceptance. 
Committee - Means the Utah Safe Drinking Water Committee. 
Executive Secretary - Means the Executive Secretary of the Utah Safe 
Drinking Water Committee. 
Must - Means that a particular action is obliged and has to be 
accomplished. 
Service Connection - The means by which a dwelling, commercial or 
industrial establishment, or other water user obtains water from the 
supplier's distribution system. Multiple dwelling units such as 
condominiums or apartments, shall be considered to have multiple 
connections. Each unit in these dwellings shall be considered to have 
one connection. 
Shall - Means that a particular action is obliged and has to be 
accomplished. 
Should - Means that a particular action is recommended but does not 
have to be accomplished. 
Water Supplier - Means a person who owns or operates a public water 
system. 
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DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
12.0 WATER MAIN DESIGN 
12.0.1 DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM PRESSURE 
The distribution system shall be designed to maintain a minimum 
pressure of 20 psi (at ground level) at all points of connection 
to the distribution system during peak instantaneous flow condi-
tions, including fire flow conditions. 
However, non-community systems in remote areas can be exempted 
from this requirement, on a case-by-case basis, if flow from the 
system is always unregulated and free-flowing. 
12.0.2 PEAK INSTANTANEOUS FLOW RATES 
Peak instantaneous flow rates for domestic use to be assumed when 
designing distribution systems shall be as given in Section 5 of 
these regulations. 
Peak instantaneous flow rates for fire flow conditions shall be 
determined by the engineer and reported to the Bureau of Public 
Water Supplies during the plan review process. 
Peak instantaneous fire flows.must be added to peak instantaneous 
domestic demands for distribution system design. 
12.0.3 MINIMUM WATER MAIN SIZE 
The distribution system shall be sized to deliver the peak instan-
taneous demand rate as determined in Section 5 while maintaining 
the pressures required by Section 12.0.1. Minimum size serving a 
fire hydrant on a community system shall be six inch diameter. 
For supply lines not connected to fire hydrants serving community 
systems, the minimum line size shall be two inch diameter. Sizes 
of lines serving non-community systems shall be reviewed on a 
case-by-case basis. Mains should be designed with sufficient 
excess capacity to provide for anticipated future connections. 
12-8 
On all new and extensive distribution system construction, evi-
dence of satisfactory disinfection must be provided to the Bureau 
of Public Water Supplies. Samples for bacteriologic analyses must 
be collected after disinfection is complete and the system is re-
filled with potable water. The use of water for culinary purposes 
must not commence until the bacteriologic tests indicate the water 
to be free from contamination. 
12.5 CROSS CONNECTIONS AND INTERCONNECTIONS 
There shall be no physical cross connections between the distribution 
system and pipe, pumps, hydrants, or tanks which are supplied from, or 
which may be supplied or contaminated from, any source except as ap-
proved by the Executive Secretary. 
The approval of the Executive Secretary shall be obtained for inter-
connections between different potable water supply systems. 
12.6 WATER HAULING 
wmmm - — Water hauling is not an acceptable permanent method for culinary water 
distribution in community water systems. However, the Executive 
Secretary may allow its use for non-community public water supplies 
if: 
1. Consumers could not otherwise be supplied with good quality 
drinking water, or 
2. The nature of the development, or ground conditions, are such 
that the placement of a pipe distribution system is not justi-
fied. 
Hauling may also be necessary as a temporary means of providing 
culinary water in an emergency. 
All proposals for water hauling must be submitted to and approved by 
the Executive Secretary. The guidelines for water hauling are 
contained in the bulletin entitled "Recommended Procedures for 
Hauling Culinary Water" available from the Bureau of Public Water 
Supplies. 
i £ ^ J S E R ^ 
12.7.1 SERVICE TAPS 
Service taps shall be made so as to not jeopardize the sanitary 
quality of the system's water. 
12-9 
12.7.2 SERVICE LINES 
The portion of the service line under the control of the water 
supplier is considered to be part of the distribution system and 
shall comply with all requirements given herein. Attention is 
drawn to Section 12.2 with regards to service lines crossing sewer 
lines. 
12.7.3 SERVICE METERS 
Each service connection should be individually metered. 
12.7.4 ALLOWABLE CONNECTIONS 
All dwellings or other facilities connected to a public water 
supply must be in conformance with the Utah Plumbing Code. 
